On 19 July Javier Solana, the EU High Representative on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is visiting Ukraine. The visit will be a good opportunity to bring the EU and Ukraine closer on a foreign policy issue perceived as a test for the post-Kuchma Ukraine - the problem of Transnistria. Ukraine will need to europeanise its Youshchenko plan on Transnistria by merging into it parts of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Action Plans signed between the EU and Ukraine and Moldova. Ukraine could think if it should associate itself with the EU travel ban against Transnistrian authorities if they don't democratise. In response the EU will need to strengthen Ukraine's involvement into CFSP by developing a special arrangement on CFSP association for Ukraine. .

Transnistria is a secessionist entity in the east of Moldova that controls 452 km of the Ukraine-Moldova border which gives its elites significant possibilities to benefit from smuggling, trafficking, money laundering, arms exports and other illegal and semi-legal activities. To eliminate these problems the presidents of Ukraine and Moldova invited the EU to support an international border monitoring mission which would reduce from the security challenges arising from the region. Earlier in may Ukraine presented a plan on the settlement of the conflict. Its main idea is that Transnistria should be democratised in order to reduce the power of its authoritarian leadership which has been obstructing a settlement of the conflict since 1992. The mechanism is that of empowering the region's parliament through free and fair internationally observed elections.

The main concern about the Youshchenko plan, raised by everybody in Moldova as well as the EU Special Representative on Moldova, is that it is unrealistic to organise quickly free elections in a secessionist authoritarian de facto state which practically lacks independent media and NGOs, political parties or opposition leaders. Under such conditions the current secessionist authorities would win by default. Under such conditions, the issue is how to democratise Transnistria, without entrenching the separation of Moldova and without legitimising the current Belarus-type leadership of the region?

All agree that Transnistria should be democratised. How to do that is a thornier issue. The Youshchenko plan makes an attempt at that, but it should go a few steps forward. Political and economic provisions of the EU-Moldova Action Plan signed under the European Neighbourhood Policy should be introduced as much as possible into the Youshchenko Plan on Transnistria. Such a measure would serve the two central objectives of the Ukrainian plan: democratising Transnistria and reuniting Moldova.

This is good idea for a number of reasons. Firstly, it will set clear benchmarks for the democratisation of Transnistria. The ENP action plans with Moldova, Ukraine and other EU neighbours give priority to democracy and human rights issues, setting benchmarks on how to proceed with political reform. It will not be easy for Transnistrians to dismiss such pressure on political reform as Moldovan imposed democracy on Transnistria. EU neighbours such as Morocco and Jordan, the Palestinian Authority and Tunis, let alone Moldova and Ukraine all accepted the EU benchmarks on political reform. Why should Transnistria be an exception?

Secondly, merging parts of the ENP Action Plan with the Youshchenko Plan on Transnistria will lead to greater convergence between Moldova and Transnistria's economic and political systems. This is a pragmatic measure. If the idea starts to be implemented, Transnistria and Moldova will move towards a greater convergence in economic, social and eventually political standards. Under such conditions, the eventual reunification of Moldova would not happen on a Moldovan, Ukrainian or Russian -imposed platform, as all previously suggested models of conflict resolution, but according to European-wide accepted models of economy and politics. It would aim at the Europeanisation, not Moldovenisation of Transnistria. The implementation of the economic provisions of the APs in Transnistria will build a basis for economic reunification of Moldova. It would also be a thing that the Transnistrian economy sooner or later will have to do, since anyways it is very dependent on trade with the EU. Sounds nice in theory, but what about practice?

It is unrealistic to expect Transnistria to associate itself entirely to the EU-Moldova Action Plan, let alone implement it until 2008. Transnistria is an unrecognised statelet without any political dialogue with the EU or member states. It lacks bureaucrats speaking English or knowing what the EU is about and how it functions. The region's leadership is on an EU visa ban… and surely does not want to undertake reforms in line with the Action Plan, as it would undermine its own powers. However, it is still possible to use two channels of pushing Transnistria for compliance with the ENP objectives, norms and standards.

First, it is Ukraine that has to raise the issue of integration of significant parts of the Action Plan into the Youshchenko Plan. Transnistria is so dependent on Ukraine's good will that it cannot refuse outright an Ukrainian initiative. It is also dependent on trade with the EU and it cannot dismiss European norms as "imperialist designs", as it is being done in Belarus or Uzbekistan. Transnistria is too dependent on external partners and too open economically to survive self-isolation. However, if Transnistria refuses to move towards greater compliance with ENP norms on democracy, Ukraine can raise the issue of aligning itself with the EU/US travel ban imposed on Transnistrian leadership. After all, on 11 September 2001 Ukraine declared its "unilateral" intention to align itself with EU CFSP declarations and actions. If Transnistria continues to obstruct international efforts to achieve a settlement, it will be time for Ukraine to consider aligning itself with the EU's foreign policy not only declaratively, but also in practice, including on the travel ban for Transnistrian leadership. In response, the EU must show greater openness in involving Ukraine in its CFSP at the preparatory level. It is a measure much sought by Ukraine.

A second channel of brining the ENP Action Plan into Transnistria is the regions' own so-called "supreme soviet" (parliament). Just two months ago, 29 out of 43 deputies of the "suprem soviet", supported by business circles tried to challenge the executive by asking for greater decentralisation of the political system through constitutional reform. The deputies are not committed democrats, but they still ask for greater pluralism. The likely outcome of the initiative will be an executive-legislative compromise on constitutional reform, likely to raise the powers of the supreme soviet. It is time for the would-be reformist deputies of the supreme soviet of Transnistria to start reading the ENP action plan. They might find there some interesting ideas on political reform and harmonisation of their economic system with the European direction taken by Ukraine and Moldova. After all, Transnistria's leader Igor Smirnov himself says that 70% percent of Transnistria's trade goes to the EU and Ukraine. Businesses in the region could benefit from such harmonisation as well as from greater trade with the EU once a settlement of the conflict is achieved.