On July 16-17, 2005, the Ukrainian Plan for the settlement of the Transnistrian conflict was presented. This led to the creation of an unprecedented situation, when Moldovan, Transnistrian, Ukrainian, and Russian authorities all support this plan. This declaratory consensus has been generated for several reasons. Firstly, the Ukrainian Plan proposes the democratization of the Transnistrian regime. For, who would be able to reject such a beautiful idea as democratization? At the same time, the democracy concept is very "elastic" and speculative. No one has signed the Ukrainian Plan and no one knows whether there is an official version of this document, however, different actors are trying to realize incompatible interests "behind" the idea of democratization.

Igor Smirnov's gang (and not only them) is trying to legislate the existing regime already after the elections of December 2005, imitating "democratization" in the version of the "ministry of state security": the Transnistrian Electoral Code is sent to be analyzed in Moscow State Duma and Kiev Supreme Rada, and the leaders of the regime use every occasion to show their willingness to take into account the obtained suggestions. At the same time, the same leaders declare that the "free, transparent, and democratic" elections into the local "supreme council" will be held on the basis of the Transnistrian legislation, which means that the Appeal of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova on the Criteria on Democratization of the Transnistrian Zone of the Republic of Moldova passed on June 10, 2005, does not have any value for them. And Valerii Litskai has declared openly that they aim at Kosovo variant, when there are representative bodies of the region that are acknowledged and formed after the elections held under the OSCE control. And when the same representative and acknowledged bodies refuse any form of integration into the Serbian state.

The idea to democratize and, subsequently, legalize the existing Transnistrian regime has not aroused any repulsion in Kiev or Moscow. Despite the pro-European statements of Ukrainian authorities, all the persons that were prohibited to enter the territory of the EU and the USA since February 27, 2003 are freely moving across the Ukrainian territory. And despite the fact that, on May 15, 2003, upon the insistence of the EU Troika, the Protocol stipulating that all the Transnistrian goods for export had to have customs labels of the Republic of Moldova, Kiev authorities allowed the circulation of goods in/from the "transnistrian republic", violating the provisions of this Protocol. This means that the Ukrainian authorities, including the "orange" ones, perceived the "transnistrian republic" as a real state that has the right to external economic relations, no matter what Chisinau would say. And the fact that "Pridnestrovie" newspaper of July 8 published on the first page the information on the decision of the Committee for Political and Security Issues of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly adopted on July 3 in Washington, upon the initiative of the Ukrainian MP Igor Ostash, to organize a "roundtable" on the elections in Transnistria in the month of September is another evidence of those from Kiev wishing to legalize the Transnistrian regime behind the Vinnitsa Plan.

The documents adopted by the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova on June 10, 2005 showed the way Chisinau authorities see the democratization process of Transnistria. As a result, there was a traditional hysteria in Tiraspol, a cold quietness in Moscow and a formal statement on the part of Kiev, saying that the Republic of Moldova did not reject the Vinnitsa Plan. For, the same Plan stipulated that the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova would adopt "The Law of the Republic of Moldova on the basic provisions of the status of the Transnistrian region of the Republic of Moldova (Transnistria), which gives the legal basis to the previously coordinated provisions of the special legal status of Transnistria" prior to the month of July 2005. The Ukrainian Plan did not make it clear whom these provisions were to be coordinated with, but the commitment of Chisinau was very straightforward.

The Law on the basic provisions of the special legal status of the localities from the left bank of Nistru River (Transnistria) passed on July 22, 2005 dotted all the "i's" and crossed all the "t's". Firstly, Chisinau cannot be accused of undermining the Ukrainian Plan. At the same time, Chisinau's position with regard to a number of principled moments is set up at the level of the law. The Transnistrian elections can be considered free, transparent, and democratic only after fulfilling the condition of Transnistria's demilitarization, especially after the Russian Federation respects its commitments regarding "the integral, urgent, and transparent evacuation of the military troops and armament from the territory of the Republic of Moldova". And the condition of carrying out the elections in accordance with the legislation of the Republic of Moldova (not according the "electoral code" of the "transnistrian moldovan republic") is as straightforward, and only after the conditions "of democratization and demilitarization of Transnistria" passed by the Decision of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova No.117-XVI of June 10, 2005 are fulfilled.

Also, it results from this Law that the Transnistrian democratization process will not end together with the "elections" planned for December in Transnistria. While the Decision of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of May 26, 2005, by which, in accordance with the Protocol of May 15, 2005, order is nevertheless going to be re-established at the Moldovan-Ukrainian border, without well-paid "exceptions" along the Transnistrian segment, is going to be applied soon.

Moreover, the Law passed on July 22, 2005 excludes the notion of "external guarantees", which means that Moldova, finally, gives up the notion of "guarantor country", which, among us, contradicts the same Ukrainian Plan. Well, that's the fate of plans, which are not signed by anyone, whereas many throng as to carry it out…

It results from the above-stated that by passing the Law of July 22, Chisinau wants to achieve several goals. The first is to hinder the attempts to legislate the "transnistrian moldovan republic" behind the democratization demagogy of the existing regime. At the same time, it formulates the legal framework, within the limits of which the Government of Moldova has committed itself to unify the country and the existence of which cannot be neglected by the other actors.

At the same time, this Law does not tell us how its provisions are to be implemented, especially when the issue of the international terrorism and energy resources is skilfully exploited by Russia within its relations with the EU and the USA. This means that after passing the Law of July 22, we need a National Strategy of Unification of the Republic of Moldova, which, if it is passed in the Parliament, will become a guide for the whole society and, what is more important, will become a clear message that has to be brought to the attention of all the good people from Transnistria.

July 26, 2005