Hasty signing of a new document ("Kozak Memorandum" or any other declaration) could lead to a virtual rather than real reintegration of the republic that would endanger the functioning of Moldova as a state and its rapprochement with the EU. The real reintegration will not take place through signing of a document. We all know how all kinds of "papers" are treated in the post-Soviet space very well.

The discussions about Moldova's reintegration should take into account two historical precedents relevant for Moldova. The first one is Cyprus. In 1964, following some political tension and violent clashes, the Greek and the Turkish communities came to a constitutional compromise… on paper. However, that agreement proved to be dysfunctional. It did not lead to a real reintegration of Cyprus. On the contrary, the tensions in Cyprus constantly aggravated and finally culminated in a war in 1974.

After 10 years since the so-called "compromise", Cyprus showed very clearly that signing of agreements did not necessarily lead to peace and could even destabilize the situation in the future. The war in 1974 was followed by a long period, during which the Greek part of Cyprus modernized, Europeanized and acceded to the EU. Today the Greek Cyprus is thrice more prospering than the Turkish Cyprus. It was the political and economic progress in the Greek part of the island that made tens of thousands of people of Turkish origin to go out in the streets demanding reunification in 2002-2003. The former separatists became pro-integrationists. The Cyprus case demonstrated that reunification took place not through signing of documents, but through changing the real conditions. Today Cyprus is closer to reunification than ever.

The second example is Adjaria region of Georgia. Within 2002-2004 it was a semi-separatist region unlike separatist Abkhazia or South Ossetia. In reality, Adjaria was separated from the rest of Georgia. Led by Aslan Abashidze, Adjaria had its own paramilitary units, controlled and levied taxes at the border with Turkey and at the port of Batumi. It had a closed, authoritarian political system that was politically isolated from the rest of Georgian territory. The central Georgian government had practically no influence on Adjaria. The Russian Federation maintained the military presence in Adjaria and was very influential due to close relations with Abashidze. Even though separate, Adjaria was not separatist. At the level of declarations, Adjaria recognized the territorial integrity of Georgia and officially considered itself a part of Georgia, used Georgian currency and (which was very important) had representatives in the Parliament of Tbilisi. Abashidze's party would always "get" 95 per cent of votes in Adjaria and all the MPs from Adjaria voted in Tbilisi Parliament as Abashidze told them. During his last years of presidency, Eduard Shevardnadze counted a lot on those MPs from Adjaria who actually helped him maintain more or less a majority in the Parliament. In exchange for the support provided to the authoritarian Tbilisi leader, Adjaria remained de facto separate from the rest of Georgia. In 2004, Mikhail Saakashvili forced Abashidze to flee to Russia and ensured full reintegration of Adjaria into Georgia. Saakashvili succeeded in reintegrating Adjaria due to three factors. First of all, Saakashvili was more popular in Adjaria than Abashidze. Secondly, Saakashvili exercised military pressure on Abashidze, bringing Georgian military forces to the border with Adjaria and threatening with a military intervention. Thirdly, Russia did not get involved. As a result, the political system of Abashidze imploded. The danger for Moldova is that Transnistria could become like Adjaria during the times of Shevardnadze. Separate in reality, but non-separatist in declarations. Reunification according to the Adjarian model would not be probable in the nearest future, as the conditions present in Georgia in 2004 are not present in Moldova: the president Voronin or his successor are not popular in Transnistria, Russia will not stay aside, and Moldova is not going to exercise military pressure.

The "Adjaria precedent" or virtual reintegration is the most dangerous prospect for Moldova at this stage. A quick regulation before the elections based on the rules imposed by Russia will hardly change anything in Transnistria, but will change a lot in Moldova. With or without Smirnov, Russia will try to create all the premises for keeping the current de facto situation in Transnistria: maintaining an isolated authoritarian political system, upon which Chisinau will not have any real influence; parliamentary forces independent from Moldova, local special services, control of the external border and Russian military presence in one form or another.

At the same time, many things will change in Moldova. Transnistria will recognize officially (but not in the reality) the sovereignty of Moldova, will send about 20 representatives to the Chisinau parliament maintaining the balance of power, will vote altogether as Tiraspol will tell them and will become the main mediators in the fragmentized Moldovan political system. Thus, Tiraspol will be imposing the rules of the game on any Chisinau administration for many years or even decades ahead. Transnistria will have the necessary authority and tools to block the efforts of Moldova to reform, Europeanize and consolidate itself as a state. Moldova, in its turn, will have minimal levers to influence the virtually integrated Transnistria. The Republic of Moldova can easily become the hostage of Transnistria, just like Shevardnadze was once the hostage of Adjaria.

However, reintegration is possible, but only by changing Moldovan realities and not by signing some papers that no one is going to take seriously in Moscow or in Tiraspol. This reintegration is already happening. Transnistrian businesses become part of the single economic space of the Republic of Moldova; due to Moldovan customs stamps, the Transnistrian exports to the EU are growing massively (making the Transnistrian economy even more dependant on Chisinau), and Transnistrian universities apply for accreditation with the Ministry of Education in Chisinau. Moldova requires consolidation and intensification of the current trends both in the process of Transnistrian settlement and in its rapprochement with the EU. The closer to the EU, the more functional, more prosperous Moldova is going to be, and the more real chances it will have for a real, not a virtual reintegration.

Nicu Popescu, Researcher at the European Council for Foreign Relations, London

Flux, September 5, 2008