Nicu Popescu, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels

The present article is based on "The EU in Moldova - Settling conflicts in the Neighbourhood", Occasional Paper 60, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, October 2005, http://www.iss-eu.org/occasion/occ60e.html

The EU has been increasingly involved in conflict resolution in Transnistria. The EU has already appointed an EU Special Representative for Moldova and launched an EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine that would monitor the border between the two countries. These actions have been useful, but more is needed if a viable solution to the conflict is to be attained. The key objective now must be to shatter the status quo in this conflict by building an attractive and Europeanised Moldova that would present a serious option for reunification. How should the EU pursue this objective?

The answer lies in a combination of EU actions aimed at supporting a politically and economically attractive Moldova, and supporting pluralism inside Transnistria to allow a new structure of economic and political interests to emerge. The EU must act at three levels: the regional level, Moldova and Transnistria.

1 Altering the regional context

The main objective of EU actions at the regional level must be to break the structures of interests that help sustain the status quo around Transnistria. Altering the external conditions that sustain Transnistria will require actions at the European level, continued EU dialogue with the United States and a coherent EU policy on Russia and Ukraine, particularly on the border question, as well as on the existing conflict resolution mechanisms and the withdrawal of Russian troops.

The European level

With the failure of the Constitutional Treaty ratification, the EU needs a stronger Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in its neighbourhood, especially for countries like Moldova and Ukraine whose EU membership aspirations are not likely to be satisfied in the short to medium term. Internal problems in the EU should be compensated with a more active pursuit of the EU's commitment to stability in its neighbourhood.

Developments in the EU's eastern neighbourhood pave the way for the EU to play a decisive role in the region. The Black Sea region is emerging as a more coherent entity and is more present on the EU agenda. Important developments here are Romanian and Bulgarian EU accession in 2007/2008, the revolutionary changes in Ukraine and Georgia, and Turkey's continued Europeanisation. The borders of the EU will extend to the Black Sea, and it will be expected by its partners in the region to play a more active role. A Black Sea dimension of EU policies is likely to emerge.

Certainly, Romania's future EU accession, coupled with the reinvigorated Romania-Moldova partnership after a change in government in Romania in December 2004, can significantly strengthen the EU's capacity to support conflict resolution in Transnistria and also support wider ENP objectives in Moldova.

At the European level, it is important to work for greater coordination on Transnistria on the part of EU member states. Politically, such coordination is already present and relatively effective. However, more can be done. The EU is one of the biggest trading partners of Transnistria, which gives it significant leverage over the conflict resolution process. This potential must be activated by greater coordination between EU member states.

The EU-Russia dialogue

EU policy towards Russia should pursue EU interests as they are stated in the ENP. As a European Commission report in 2004 on relations with Russia stresses 'The EU should make full use of its influence with Russia to promote and defend EU interests and to ensure a balanced relationship. This means bringing together issues in which Russia is anxious to see progress with our own goals'.[1] The Communication also states that '[t]he EU should demonstrate its readiness to engage with the NIS on the basis of its own strategic objectives, cooperating with Russia whenever possible'. The EU's primary interest in Transnistria is to settle the conflict. Working with Russia on the creation of a common space for external security provides the framework where a cooperative approach can be crafted on this conflict. The EU-Russia Road Map on a Common Space for External Security adopted in May 2005 explicitly mentions among its objectives the need for 'practical co-operation on crisis management in order to prepare the ground for joint initiatives (…) in the settlement of regional conflicts, inter alia in regions adjacent to EU and Russian borders'. Eliminating Transnistria as an irritant from the EU-Russia relations is in the interest of both partners. Two issues are key in this dialogue - the withdrawal of Russian troops and the reform of the current peacekeeping mechanism.

First, maintaining the withdrawal issue high on the agenda is crucial. The Russian troops are a security pillar for the Transnistrian regime (willingly or not). Breaking the status quo is unimaginable without a full withdrawal. Russian peacekeeping forces may remain, of course, for conflict settlement purposes if under international mandate and in a new multilateral framework. However, maintaining a military base - the OGRT - in Moldova creates an obstacle to conflict settlement, which throws doubts over Russia's status as a neutral mediator.

Second, a discussion with Russia on the peacekeeping mechanisms in Transnistria would be useful. The current peacekeeping operation cannot address many of the non-military issues that arise around this conflict. They did not prevent the deployment on Transnistrian militias in the supposedly demilitarised Security Zone. They did not prevent clashes between Transnistrian military and police forces and residents of villages in the region under the authority of Chisinau. In fact, the military nature of the peacekeeping operation tends only to further militarise the region while failing to address serious questions that arise on the ground.

One way to assuage these problems would be to strengthen the civilian dimension of the peacekeeping operation by increasing the number of international civilian observers and even gendarmerie-type forces, which could in time replace the current peacekeeping forces. Taking into consideration that several EU member states are working on the development of a European gendarmerie force (EUGENFOR), a EU-Russia-Ukraine gendarmerie-led peace support mission should be considered to replace the current operation. A mission of civilian observers or a gendarmerie-led operation would also provide reassurances to Russia that once its troops withdrew, no other foreign military forces would be deployed. One should also note that Russia is less prickly with regard to civilian crisis management operations, which opens the way for the EU to act in an area where it can be useful, and provide clear value added.

The EU-Ukraine dialogue

The EU dialogue with Ukraine on the Transnistria problem should have two pillars. One is to enhance EU-Ukraine cooperation on CFSP and ESDP matters and the second is to monitor the Ukraine-Moldova border with EU support.

First, in the context of Ukraine's efforts to associate itself with the CFSP, greater realignment of Ukraine with the EU policy on Transnistria should be sought, including with regard to the sanctions and the travel ban against the Transnistrian leadership. This would be a difficult step for Ukraine, but it would help drive the Europeanisation of Ukraine's foreign policy. CFSP coordination with Ukraine is an essential part of breaking the deadlock.

Second, EU support for solving the border problem around Transnistria is crucial. Controlling the border would eliminate some of the security challenges that arise from the separatist region. It would also weaken the vitality of the authoritarian and corrupt regime in Tiraspol. Without effective control of this border, Moldova will face serious constraints on its ability to benefit from more openness in trade with the EU under autonomous trade preferences (asymmetric trade regime), because it would not be able to enforce a clear control of the origin of goods, which is a precondition for increased trade with the EU. Thus, indirectly, the wider success of the ENP project with Moldova depends to a large extent on the border issue.

There are two aspects to ensuring transparency on the Transnistrian segment of the Moldovan-Ukrainian border. The first step of launching a EU border monitoring mission has been taken. The next step is to have joint Moldova-Ukraine border posts on the whole border between the countries. On the Transnistrian segment, these joint posts would be situated on Ukrainian territory, thus allowing Moldovan authorities to monitor exports and imports into Transnistria with their Ukrainian counterparts. Combining these two levels - EU border monitoring and Moldo-Ukrainian joint border posts - would ensure transparency and reliability of the border, which is a problem that concerns the EU, and not only Moldova and Ukraine.

2 Policies towards Moldova

The main objective of EU policy should be helping make Moldova attractive for all of its citizens by strengthening its institutions.

How? In the person of the EUSR, the EU has a channel for undertaking coherent and sustained initiatives on the conflict resolution process. The EUSR is, thus, the EU's principal actor in the conflict itself. In addition, the EU is present with a Commission delegation that is responsible for the implementation of the Action Plan and the management of ENPI programmes. The question is how to make the existing EU actors - the EUSR Moldova and the Commission delegation - work together towards a sustainable resolution of the conflict?

Making the Action Plan work

Moldova's current lack of attractiveness is a key element sustaining the status quo. Pursuing economic reform, designing a good business climate and ensuring deeper and faster democratisation of Moldova are central conflict-resolution tools with regard to Transnistria. The EU-Moldova Action Plan is important for the transformation of Moldova along these lines, but wider EU support is crucial for creating an attractive Moldova.

The Action Plan is too 'thick' on Moldova's commitments and too 'thin' on EU responsibilities. The balance should be redressed by offering more EU and member states' support for Moldova for the implementation of the AP. The AP should not be just a technical exercise for the Moldovan government, and its wider political and security aims should be well understood and supported.

More openness from the EU in allowing for the circulation of Moldovan citizens, particularly students, businessmen and civil society activists, would be important. As would greater openness of markets. All of these measures have an impact on the conflict resolution process in Transnistria. A European perspective for Moldova is likely to have effects on Transnistria as well. Such measures would not provoke a flood of Transnistrians willing to rejoin Moldova, but they would build an understanding of the benefits of rapprochement with Moldova for the most important and active groups of Transnistrian society. Of course, EU support in making Moldova attractive will not bear fruit without a clear commitment from Moldova to democracy, decentralisation and economic reform.

Negotiating the status of Transnistria

Negotiations on solving the conflict are important. The Republic of Moldova needs a better image in the Transnistrian region, and needs to talk to potential forces inside Transnistria, principally within business circles, that would favour a settlement of the conflict. The conflict cannot be settled by unilaterally designing a law on Transnistrian autonomy inside Moldova - an approach favoured by many in Chisinau. While there are indeed significant questions about the legitimacy of Transnistria's leaders, the strength of the separatist entity should not be underestimated. Even if the current leadership in Tiraspol led by Igor Smirnov collapses (not an unlikely scenario), many of the ideas and structures of interests sustaining the separatist entities will remain in place. These will need to be addressed by Moldova and the international community even if the Smirnov regime collapses.

However, negotiations, particularly in the five-sided format, should not be the main focus of international efforts to support conflict resolution in Transnistria. The main issue is to alter the structures of conflict - making Transnistria untenable and Moldova attractive, rather than seeking an early agreement on the status of Transnistria. Thus, the main priority of the international community should be to alter the conflict environment. No power-sharing agreement between Moldova and Transnistria will fix the problem, if its provisions are not based on the positive interests of citizens in Moldova and the Transnistrian region. And these will take time and international efforts to build.

More ESDP for Moldova

It is not enough to alter the status quo, this change must be sustained. This will require actions that strengthen the institutional capacity of Moldova to ensure control over its borders and the effectiveness of Moldovan law-enforcement agencies in general. The use of ESDP civilian capabilities in Moldova under the guidance of the EUSR would be crucial in this respect.

At the invitation of Moldova and Ukraine, the EU is working on the deployment of a border-monitoring mission on the Transnistrian segment of the border. However useful, this is not a long-term solution. In parallel, the EU should strengthen Moldova's capacity to undertake this monitoring and control on its own. At the same time as ensuring that the border will be monitored by the international community in the initial stages, the EU should launch a police mission inside Moldova. This mission should have two objectives - building an integrated border management system and strengthening the capacity of Moldovan law-enforcement agencies. Both are priorities noted in the AP, which mentions the necessity for Moldova to transform the 'Border Guards into a law enforcement agency' and declares the need to 'enhance the Moldovan law enforcement authorities (police, border guards, customs) through the provision of modern equipment, facilities and training in order to increase in particular the effectiveness of border crossing checkpoints'.[2]

An EU police mission to Moldova would enhance Moldova's capability to deal with security problems through the reinforcement of law-enforcement agencies. More importantly, this mission would be a conflict resolution mechanism. The EU has experience of this kind of operation already. For example, the mandate of the EU Police Mission PROXIMA in the FYR of Macedonia has objectives that are applicable to Moldova, namely that 'the mission will support the development of an efficient and professional police service and promote European standards of policing (…) EU police experts will monitor, mentor and advise the country's police, thus helping to fight organised crime more effectively and consolidate public confidence in policing'.[3] In Moldova, as in FYROM, the border issue is directly relevant for the stabilisation of the country. The positive EU experience acquired in FYROM is relevant for Moldova, where there is a direct link between conflict resolution and strengthening the institutional capacity of the state, better border management and more effective law-enforcement agencies.

Deploying a EU police mission in a pre-settlement environment would be innovative, and its aim would be to help create conditions for the settlement of the conflict. The EU should not wait until Transnistria decides to reunite with Moldova. This will not happen without additional measures that induce it to reconsider some of its positions, including an EU Police Mission. The police mission should be undertaken in parallel with the international border monitoring mission, and would be designed to prepare the Moldovan agencies to replace the international monitoring of the border in two or three years. A possible date for the launch of the police mission will be March 2006 when the mandate of the EUSR is to be renewed and extended.

3 Policies on Transnistria

The main objectives of EU policy should be to make the situation unattractive for those who benefit from the current situation and to promote the greater openness of Transnistria. These aims may be contradictory at times, as they can bring into conflict the need for greater sanctions against parts of the Transnistrian elites with the need to engage in dialogue with segments of the same elite. A fine balancing act will be needed. But such balance is not out of the reach of the EU. With Ukraine willing to come closer to the EU, Transnistria cannot afford greater isolation and centralisation as it lacks resources for self-sustainability and its fundamental source of legitimacy is economic and not ethnic. Thus, Transnistria's response to international pressure to democratise is unlikely to be greater centralisation and self-isolation, as is the case in Belarus and Uzbekistan.

Supporting pluralism

Transnistrian authoritarianism should not be tolerated. There is no cultural, historical, geographical or other excuse for Transnistrian authorities not to comply with universal human rights. Supporting pluralism will mean supporting capacity building for NGOs in the region because Transnistria will be a clear situation where in the aftermath of a dictatorial regime 'local NGOs are unlikely to have the capacity to apply for funding from Brussels'.[4] Considering Transnistria's dependence on external trade and Ukraine, the Tiraspol authorities are in no position to seriously clamp down on civil society under current conditions. Ways of engaging Ukrainian NGOs in the efforts to support pluralism and democracy in Transnistria might be considered.

The measures proposed to support civil society would require limited dialogue with the Transnistrian authorities. This is happening already. The United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID) is financing projects in Transnistria. On similar lines, the EU itself is already engaged in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia. EU and member states should follow a similar path of strengthening civil society in Transnistria and engaging with moderate elements in the Transnistrian authorities and business groups. With pressure on Transnistria growing, the region's elites are diverging more and more on what path Transnistria should take. International actions should seek to strengthen moderates. Business groups already see the effects of Transnistria's isolation, and some, despite pressures from the executive, might consider a diversification of their options rather than supporting the existing regime.

Investing in the future

European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) funds should be made available for programmes in Transnistria. In this respect, greater EU visibility in Transnistria is important. The EU should consider opening a European Information Centre in Bender/Tighina. Such a measure would facilitate direct engagement and support for civil society in Transnistria, under the conditions when the Transnistrian authorities are increasingly trying to limit civil society dialogue across the river Nistru and access of Transnistrian NGOs to foreign funding.

EU assistance to developing frameworks of dialogue between civil society, mass media and professional associations in Moldova and Transnistria should be expanded.

Support for education in Transnistria could have a positive impact. Priority areas would be English-language teaching[5] and developing greater knowledge about the EU across the region. The lack of language skills in Transnistria at all levels - official, civil society and university- is a major obstacle to efforts to transform Transnistria. Supporting the development of courses on the EU, its history, institutions and policies in Transnistrian universities, the same way as in Moldova (with TACIS funding) would be an inexpensive and effective long-term investment. In addition, Transnistrian students should have guaranteed access as Moldovan citizens to EU-Moldova student and academic exchange programmes envisaged in the Action Plan such as Erasmus, and Tempus Mundus and Intas.

Sanctions Transnistria is very vulnerable to economic sanctions. The most credible pillar of its ideology is the economy, and it is also a very open economy with a high degree of trade with the EU and the US.

Targeted sanctions against certain individuals and companies could be expanded to maintain the momentum of international pressure on Transnistria to democratise. Consideration might be given to freezing the accounts of companies involved in illicit trading, particularly with regards to weapons. Such measures as freezing bank accounts held in the West by Transnistrian leaders, key supporters of the regime and the 'state' institutions of the region, should also be considered. The travel ban has to be extended to some representatives of business circles that form the 'inner circle' of the regime. Economic elites in Transnistria should be convinced that supporting the current regime is too costly.

Incentives

Sanctions are necessary to break the deadlock and make the status quo unattractive and untenable. At the same time, incentives are necessary to build the basis for a sustainable solution. Once settlement is achieved, the main incentive would be trade opportunities with the EU for Transnistrian companies that have legalised their status with the Moldovan authorities and cease to support the secessionist authorities. Promising greater business opportunities after a settlement is achieved will make business groups interested in supporting a settlement.

The Transnistrian pro-independence economic arguments should be countered. Moldova should state clearly that Transnistria will not participate in the repayment of Moldova's international debts once reunification happens. A dialogue with the current international investors in Transnistria on the prospects of conflict resolution should be launched. This is a delicate issue, but efforts should be made to ensure that these are not stakeholders in the separatist project.

Europeanising Transnistria

Ways of integrating Transnistria into the ENP framework and associating Transnistria with the implementation of the EU-Moldova Action Plan should be explored. The idea of implementing the Action Plan in Transnistria could be put forward by Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities as part of the conflict settlement process. Such a measure would serve the two central objectives: democratising Transnistria and reuniting Moldova.

Efforts to make implementation of the ENP AP in Transnistria one of the elements of the conflict resolution process could have a number of positive effects. Firstly, it will set clear benchmarks for the democratisation of Transnistria in line with widely accepted standards in the EU neighbourhood. Moreover, it will not be easy for Transnistrians to dismiss such pressure on political reform as if it were a case of Moldova imposing democracy on Transnistria. Secondly, progress in this direction would also prepare the ground for greater convergence between the Moldovan and Transnistrian political, economic and legal systems and support the effort to reunite the two parts of a divided country on the basis of European norms.

While the Transnistrian executive is likely to be opposed to such measures, open partners can be found in the region's parliament (Supreme Soviet). In fact, the Supreme Soviet could adopt some of the legislation required in accordance with the Action Plan; this would be in line also with the Transnistrian parliament's own initiatives on the reform of the political system.

Conclusions and recommendations

A key objective of the European Union is to have a stable, secure, prosperous and democratic neighbourhood. Failing the possibility of offering accession to close neighbours in the medium term, the EU should and can offer stronger CFSP engagement in the region. Contributing to conflict resolution in its neighbourhood is key to the achievement of EU objectives.

Settling the conflict requires an international effort. The focus of EU policy should be to alter the context in which the conflict is situated and sustained, rather than hoping for an early agreement on the status of Transnistria. The primary objective should be to increase Moldova's 'attractiveness' while decreasing the benefits of maintaining the current status quo. The Transnistrian separatist project is very much based on false economic arguments for independence. Undermining these claims will be central to efforts to reunify the country.

In order to achieve a sustainable settlement of the conflict, the EU should consider actions at a number of levels:

The European level

- Launch an EU Police Mission to Moldova under the political guidance of the EUSR with a mandate to construct an integrated border management system;

- Develop joint benchmarks and standards for EU companies that have dealings with Transnistria.

- Develop possible plans for a civilian peace support mission to Moldova to replace the current Russia-led peace keeping operation.

EU-Russia

- Discuss the demilitarisation of the current peacekeeping operation;

- Maintain the Russian troops withdrawal issue high on the agenda;

EU-Ukraine

- Secure greater alignment between Ukraine and the EU on CFSP joint statements and actions, including sanctions against the Transnistrian leadership;

- Support the creation of joint Moldovan-Ukrainian border posts on the whole perimeter of the border;

- Involve Ukrainian NGOs in the efforts to support democracy in Transnistria.

EU-Moldova

- Increase Moldova's attractiveness through trade liberalisation and facilitation of the visa regime for certain categories of citizens in line with areas of flexibility in the Schengen acquis;

- Increase EU and member states' support for the implementation of the ENP Action Plan.

EU-Transnistria

- Seek possibilities to start implementing some of the provisions of the EU-Moldova Action Plan in Transnistria as well, with a particular focus on political and democracy-related issues;

- Support capacity building of the civil sector in Transnistria; support dialogue between Moldovan and Transnistrian civil societies;

- Facilitate access of Transnistrian NGOs to EU funds under EIDHR and ENPI by providing more information about existing EU programmes;

- Expand targeted sanctions to key supporters of the regime from the business community, as well as against individuals and companies involved in criminal activities and human rights abuses in the region;

- Revise the objectives of sanctions. The EU should request democratisation in Transnistria with clearly set benchmarks, rather than link the travel ban to the continuation of negotiations on conflict settlement;

- Open a European Information Centre in Bender/Tighina;

- Support English-language training in Transnistria and greater access to the internet;

- Fund development of EU-related courses in Transnistrian universities;

- Involve Transnistrian students and academics in EU-Moldova exchange programmes.

References

[1] Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on relations with Russia, COM(2004) 106, Brussels, 9 February 2004.

[2] EU-Moldova Action Plan, pp. 21-22.

[3] General Affairs and External Relations Council Conclusions, Brussels, 29 September 2003.

[4] Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, The European Union's Role in promoting Human Rights and Democratisation in Third Countries, Brussels, 8 May 2001, COM(2001) 252 final, p. 16.

[5] This can be done through international volunteer organisations, such as 'Learning Enterprises', which have been engaged in teaching English language and computer skills all over the world. Another model is not-for-profit English-language teaching by such organisations like Prep2Go working in East Asia.