http://www.azi.md/news?ID=42837
It is somewhat paradoxical, but the true architect of the foreign policy of Moldova since the declaration of its independence has been neither Mircea Snegur, nor Petru Lucinschi, nor Vladimir Voronin, but Igor Smirnov. Within 15 years, Transnistria has been and still is the central element in the major decisions of Moldova. If Moldova wants to remain independent and to become a mature and prosperous European state, the situation should be changed.
The list of strategic oscillations of Moldova inspired by the Transnistrian issue is long: accession to CSI; neutrality and unwillingness to join NATO; endless ambiguities in the relations of Moldova with Ukraine and Romania. More recently, closer relations between Moldova and Russia in 2001-2003 originated mainly from the Transnistrian issue. Afterwards, the European enthusiasm suddenly intensified in Chisinau after Dmitry Kozak's departure in November of 2003 was also caused by the Transnistrian issue. The whole rapprochement of Moldova with the EU within 2003-2006 was basically based on the expectations that the EU would settle the Transnistrian conflict and not on the desire for reforms and democratization. Tension in relations with Russia in 2006 also originated from Transnistria. And the sudden re-discovery of merits of the strategic partnership with Russia at the end of 2006, the re-accession to the course of the Kozak Memorandum 2, the surprising flexibility of Chisinau regarding the presence of the Russian military in the OSCE Ministry in Brussels in December 2006 were also caused by the Transnistrian obsession. In 3 or 5 years, Moldova will probably start looking for reasons to move away from Russia again, because Moscow is going to treat Moldova like it is now treating Belarus. This kind of oscillations can last for 20 more years. However, each time the Moldovan corridor is going to compress more and more and this lack of external strategic orientation will lead to the failure of the independence project of Moldova. Moldova has already become one of the most isolated states in Europe. Its relations with almost all important external partners are very ambiguous and not sincere at all.
At the internal level, any public opinion poll in Chisinau demonstrates that the Transistrian issue is placed 8th or 9th among the priority concerns of the citizens of the Republic of Moldova. But elites persist with their Transnistrian obsession. The most discussed issue in newspapers and on TV, among NGOs and political parties, within ministries and departments, at conferences and in analytical studies is Transnistria. Corruption, unemployment, economic problems, investment climate, insecurity, corrupted or politically influenced courts, abuses of police or bureaucracy, incapacity of the government to implement the Moldova-EU Action Plan are less often referred to in the public discourse than the Transnistrian issue. It is convenient for the government. By one harsh word at the address of Igor Smirnov the government can calm the whole civil sector and the political opposition for quite a while.
It is time for the Republic of Moldova to emancipate from Transnistria both in foreign and domestic policy. In a way, Moldova has to declare its independence from the Transnistrian issue and stop defining the whole foreign policy on the basis of the Transnistrian issue. It is not Igor Smirnov who has to define the foreign policy of Moldova.
The solution for Moldova is to concentrate upon the internal priorities of European integration without any anti- or pro- European, Ukrainian, or Romanian declarations. It is necessary that the entire political attention is concentrated on the implementation of the Moldova-EU Action Plan. After a certain standstill, the EU policy towards Moldova is becoming more serious. Brussels has announced doubling of the assistance to Chisinau in 2007. In such a way, Moldova becomes the second recipient of financial assistance on the part of the EU among the neighbouring states. The number of scholarships in the EU for Moldova and other EU neighbours will radically increase from 2007 on. Also, the EU has put aside a fund of 1 billion Euros that will be distributed to the leaders in reforms among the neighbouring states. If Moldova pushes on reforms, then the EU will increase its support, including the financial one. The discussions of Moldova with the EU about the facilitation of the visa regime and trade are at an advanced stage. And the recent donor's conference has promised to provide more support to Moldova within the following 3 years than within 1992-2006. The impact of these measures will not be immediate. But Moldova can make a success. For example, within 2001-2005, Moldova recorded the highest level of trade with the EU among all Southeast European states, except for Romania and Bulgaria. The trade of Moldova with the EU grew by 51%, of Serbia by 50%, of Albania by 23%, and of Macedonia by 9%. It proves that positive results can be achieved if working seriously.
The Transnistrian issue will not be disregarded. On the contrary, support projects for the civil society of the region have to be activated. The EU Border Assistance Mission will carry on with its activity. The Transnistrian companies registered in Chisinau will get used to the new rules of the game and the perspective of their entry on the European market will increase. Anyway, Chisinau has to understand that the Transnistrian issue cannot be solved just by a single cavalier attack. Such kind of short-term transition: from the Kozak Memorandum 1 or even 2 to a "new customs regime", or change of the negotiation format, cannot change the essence of the situation in Transnistria. There is a need for the long-term game of Europeization and reintegration of Moldova.
It is time for Moldova to concentrate on its own economic and political problems. By solving them, Moldova will come closer to the moment of the reunification of the country. Only well-dressed in European clothes of prosperity and democracy Moldova has a chance to win the Transnistrian contest. The training that is necessary for Moldova is well described in the Action Plan. Even if the EU has many pupils, it is the best possible teacher. The psychological dependence on the Transnistrian issue has to be treated. And the governments of the Republic of Moldova from now and after 2008 have an opportunity to become architects of a European Moldova, the policy of which is decided in Chisinau and not in Tiraspol.
****
Nicu POPESCU is a research fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels.
Nicu POPESCU